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ARTICLE UPDATE
UPDATE TO
COLORADO WATER LAW. AN IHSTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS,JR.

To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors will periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is an
update to Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, Appendix - Colorado
Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law, selected by The
Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., and published in the Water Law
Review, Volume 1, Issue 1.

Chatfield East Well Company, Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners
Ass'n
"Waters of the natural stream, including tributary ground water,
belong to the public and are subject to use under Colorado's
constitutional prior appropriation doctrine and implementing
statutes. Rights of use thereto become perfected property rights upon
application to beneficial use. In contrast, the right to use water in
designated ground water basins, nontributary water outside of
designated ground water basins, or any Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, or
Laramie-Fox Hills ground water outside of a designated ground water
basin, is governed by the provisions of the Groundwater Management
Act. Ground water located in designated basins is subject to a
modified system of prior appropriation administered by the ground
water commission. Use of nontributary ground water and Denver
Basin aquifer water outside of designated ground water basins is
Regardless of
subject to the provisions of section 37-90-137(4).
whether water rights are obtained in accordance with prior
appropriation law, or pursuant to the Ground Water Management Act,
no person "owns" Colorado's public water resource as a result of land
ownership."
Chatfield East Well Co., Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners Assoc., 956 P.2d 1260,

1268 (Colo. 1998) (citations omitted).
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"In Bayou Land Co. v. Talley we reiterated that a right to use
nontributary ground water outside of a designated basin is purely a
function of statute and landowners do not have an absolute right to
ownership of water underneath their land. Rather, landowners have
an inchoate right to extract and use the nontributary water in
accordance with section 37-90-137(4). We held that
'[t]he right does not vest until the landowner or an individual with
the landowner's consent constructs a well in accordance with a well
permit from the state engineer and/or applies for and receives water
court adjudication. Until vesting occurs, the right to extract
nontributary ground water is subject to legislative modification or
termination.'
Id. (citations omitted).
"By means of Senate Bill 5, the General Assembly subjected Denver
Basin ground water, whether nontributary or not nontributary, to the
separate water use system of section 37-90-137(4) and required the
state engineer to promulgate rules for use of this water under section
37-90-137 (9) (b)."
Id. at 1270 (citations omitted).

City of Grand Junction v. City & County of Denver
"[W] e disagree with Grand Junction's claim that the Water Court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it examined and construed the
provisions of the Blue River Decree. We hold that the Water Court
possessed the authority to review the Blue River Decree in order to
ascertain whether Denver's application would interfere with the terms
or objectives of the decree. In doing so, we also reaffirm the
principle.., that a court of coordinate jurisdiction does not possess
the authority to enter a decree that modifies or interferes with the
objectives or terms of another court's decree."
City of GrandJunction v. City & County of Denver, 960 P.2d 675, 682-83 (Colo. 1998).

"Therefore, in the context of the priorities described in the decree,
Denver can fill Dillon Reservoir only once. In other words, all
priorities to Blue River water awarded in the Blue River Decree are
senior to Denver's rights, if any, to fill Dillon Reservoir more than
once. In the instant case, Denver ultimately sought a refill right with a
priority date of 1987, a date junior to all priorities described in the
Blue River Decree. Hence, Denver's new claim is entirely consistent
with those terms of the Blue River Decree that relate specifically to
refilling Dillon Reservoir."
Id. at 683 (footnotes omitted).
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"Furthermore, Denver's claim to a refill right at Dillon Reservoir
was not even among the subjects addressed by the Blue River Decree.
The refill right was not, and could not have been, before the Federal
Court in 1955 because Denver's first appropriation date for the refill of
the reservoir was 1965. As the Water court explained, the Federal
court in the Blue River Decree addressed only those relative priorities
at issue at the time of adjudication. The Federal Court enjoined the
parties from asserting in the future any priorities different from those
described in the Blue River Decree. Accordingly, the Federal Court
has thwarted subsequent efforts by Denver to modify, intentionally or
otherwise, the United States' senior rights to Blue River water."
Id. at 684.

"The Federal Court's continuing jurisdiction is limited to the
purpose of effectuating the objectives of the Blue River Decree ....
Denver's refill right does not interfere with the objectives of the Blue
River Decree because Denver's refill right is subject to all of the
provisions of the Blue River Decree .... Consequently, Denver's
application for a refill right with respect to Dillon Reservoir did not
implicate the Federal Court's exclusive jurisdiction to implement the
Blue River Decree. We hold, therefore, that the Water Court
possessed subject matterjurisdiction over Denver's application."
Id. at 685.

City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co.
"The conditional decree contemplated that Lafayette would not
obtain an absolute decree if it no longer had a lawful right to divert
water through the Anderson Ditch. Lafayette did not meet this test
because at the time of the trial and the entry of the proposed absolute
decree, Lafayette had no legal right to exchange water using the
Anderson Ditch for application to beneficial use.
Lafayette argues that the water court improperly injected an
additional requirement for the perfection of a conditional water right
by requiring the applicant to possess facilities to transport the water
when it ruled that 'absent a permanent means of transport[ing] water,
there can be no absolute water right.' We agree with Lafayette that the
water court's ruling is inaccurate, since Colorado law contemplates
that legal arrangements for a means of diversion may be perpetual or
for a term of years. Consistent with the terms of the stipulation
between these parties, we have concluded that the water court was
correct in declining to enter an absolute decree following trial,
because Lafayette then had no legal right to use the point of diversion
identified in the decree.
In conclusion, we hold that Lafayette demonstrated reasonable
diligence in developing the rights set forth in the 1987 decree, and
that the water court properly continued Lafayette's conditional rights
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to exchanges to the Anderson Ditch for another diligence period."
City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co., 962 P.2d 955, 963 (Colo. 1998) (citations
omitted).

Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation District
"Irrigation districts were created 'to provide means.., for bringing
into cultivation the arid lands of the state and making them highly
productive by the process of irrigation.' To accomplish this objective,
the legislature authorized irrigation districts to levy and collect special
assessments at the expense of those landowners whose lands were
serviced by irrigation waters. However, legal authority to levy and
obtain collection of special assessments does not transform an
essentially private entity into a governmental entity for Amendment 1
purposes. We have repeatedly said that irrigation district special
assessments are not general taxes characteristic of government. While
general taxes exact revenue from the public at large for general
governmental purposes, an irrigation district's special assessment
benefits specific landowners whose land the district supplies with
water. These special assessments are designated to pay the expenses,
including servicing debt, incurred in irrigating the land.
The
assessments are levied in proportion to land ownership and are paid
only by the landowners who receive the benefits. In summary, a 1921
Act irrigation district serves the interests of landowners within the
district and not the general public. As such, it cannot be said that an
increase of an irrigation district's special assessment increases the
burden of the taxpaying public which Amendment 1 sought to
regulate."
Campbell v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist., 972 P.2d 1037, 103940 (Colo. 1998)
(citations and footnotes omitted).

"[W]e conclude that the private character of a 1921 Act irrigation
district differs in essential respects from that of a public governmental
entity exercising taxing authority contemplated by Amendment 1. An
irrigation district exists to serve the interests of landowners not the
general public. Rather than being a local governmental agency, a
1921 Act irrigation district is a public corporation endowed by the state
with the powers necessary to perform its predominantly private
objective. Accordingly, we hold that an irrigation district is not a local
government within the meaning of Amendment l's taxing and
spending election requirements."
Id. at 1041.

